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Waterborne Outbreak of 
Norwalk-Like Virus 
Gastroenteritis at a Tourist 
Resort, Italy
Delia Boccia,* Alberto Eugenio Tozzi,* Benvon Cotter,*§ Caterina Rizzo,† Teresa Russo,‡ 
Gabriele Buttinelli,* Alfredo Caprioli,* Maria Luisa Marziano,* and Franco Maria Ruggeri* 
In July 2000, an outbreak of gastroenteritis occurred at a tourist resort in the Gulf of Taranto in southern
Italy. Illness in 344 people, 69 of whom were staff members, met the case definition. Norwalk-like virus
(NLV) was found in 22 of 28 stool specimens tested. The source of illness was likely contaminated drinking
water, as environmental inspection identified a breakdown in the resort water system and tap water sam-
ples were contaminated with fecal bacteria. Attack rates were increased (51.4%) in staff members involved
in water sports. Relative risks were significant only for exposure to beach showers and consuming drinks
with ice. Although Italy has no surveillance system for nonbacterial gastroenteritis, no outbreak caused by
NLV has been described previously in the country.
orwalk virus is the prototype of the genus Norwalk-like
virus (NLV) in the Caliciviridae family, which includes a
large number of genetically related strains that together repre-
sent the most important cause of gastroenteritis outbreaks
worldwide (1–2). NLV accounts for up to 96% of outbreaks of
nonbacterial gastroenteritis in the United States (3) and has
been implicated in 43% of all foodborne outbreaks in England,
67% in Sweden, and 80% in the Netherlands (4–6). 
Outbreaks of NLV gastroenteritis more frequently affect
adults and children >5 years of age. Because of the low infec-
tious dose of the agent (10–100 viral particles can induce
symptoms), outbreaks are characterized by a high secondary
attack rate (7). In most documented outbreaks, the incubation
period has been reported as 24–48 hours; the average duration
of symptoms is 12–60 hours. During an outbreak, >50% of
infected persons have symptoms of vomiting, most often in
combination with diarrhea (8). The main source of infection is
usually contaminated food or water (9–13), while the usual
mode of transmission is direct person-to-person contact with
saliva, vomit, or aerosols. Transmission may also occur
through contact with contaminated objects and surfaces such
as showers, sinks, mats, and floors (3). 
In Italy, which has no surveillance system for nonbacterial
gastroenteritis, the impact of NLV infection is unknown, and
no previous outbreaks of confirmed NLV infection have been
reported. We describe a large outbreak of gastroenteritis
caused by NLV at a resort in Italy.
Methods
The outbreak occurred at a tourist resort in the Gulf of
Taranto, southern Italy, during July 7–31, 2000 (Figure 1). The
resort has an area of 122 hectares with 456 guest rooms in 19
buildings, in addition to staff quarters. The buildings are situ-
ated around a central area where a restaurant, a swimming
pool, and the resort management office are located. The resort
can accommodate 1,000 guests, who usually arrive on a Satur-
day and depart 1 or 2 weeks later, resulting in approximately
50% turnover of guests each weekend. 
The resort’s water tank is supplied via a 1-km pipe con-
nected to the main public water supply (Figure 2). On July 13,
a break in this water pipe was observed (Figure 2, point 2).
Inspection also showed a bypass connecting the tank to an
unused irrigation system (Figure 2, points 4 and 5). 
On July 18, 2000, the local health unit and the Institute of
Hygiene of the Faculty of Medicine in Bari were notified
about an outbreak of gastroenteritis at the resort. An epidemio-
logic investigation was initiated the same day to identify the
agent and the mode and vehicle of transmission and to
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Figure 1. Map of Italy, showing location of tourist resort 
on Gulf of Taranto.
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implement control measures. By July 20, when the local health
unit notified the Istituto Superiore di Sanità in Rome, the out-
break had already been in progress for approximately 2 weeks
and >150 persons were ill.
Outbreak Investigation
A case was defined as illness in any guest or employee
who stayed at the tourist resort during the period July 1–31 and
who had diarrhea (three or more loose stools in any 24-hour
period) or vomiting (at least one episode) or both, in the same
period. Case finding was done by checking records of the
resort medical center; after July 20, a door-to-door search was
initiated. Demographic data and information on symptoms
were collected in face-to-face interviews by the medical staff
of the local health unit and the University of Bari. 
Because of the high number of cases in resort staff mem-
bers, a retrospective cohort study was performed to assess risk
factors associated with illness in this group. Persons eligible
for the study were staff members employed at the resort from
July 1 to 31. Standard questionnaires were sent to all 224 staff
members in the first week of August. Information requested
included name, date of birth, sex, room number, job type, date
of onset and type of symptoms, and water and food prefer-
ences. A month had elapsed between onset of symptoms and
distribution of the questionnaires. We did not inquire about
actual food history and activities of staff members during the
outbreak but rather about their food preferences and usual
activities.
Statistical Analysis
The questionnaires from guests and staff members were
returned to the Istituto Superiore di Sanità, where the data
were analyzed by using SPSS Base 10.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago,
IL) and Epi-Info 6.04 (Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, Atlanta, GA). Information collected on cases was
used to construct the epidemic curve and describe the clinical
presentation of the disease. Attack rates, denominator data,
personal characteristics, and clinical symptoms of cases were
compared between guests and staff members by chi square or
Fisher exact test when appropriate; the Mann-Whitney U-test
was used for comparisons of age. The room location of ill per-
sons was plotted on a map of the resort that included water
pipelines in an attempt to identify any clustering of cases along
the pipeline. Statistical test for clustering was performed by
the cluster k-means method with SPSS Base 10.0 (SPSS Inc.).
In the cohort study, the attack rate was calculated for the
total staff and also by specific job type. Relative risks and 95%
confidence intervals were also calculated for job type, behav-
iors and activities, and food preferences. 
Laboratory Investigations
From July 18 to 28, samples (28 fecal and 2 vomit speci-
mens) were collected from 30 participants whose illness met
the case definition. Part of each specimen was stored at -20°C
until examination for viral particles and free fecal cytotoxins,
and the rest was refrigerated and processed within 12 hours of
collection.
Ova and parasites were detected by direct microscopy, and
Salmonella, Shigella, Campylobacter, Yersinia enterocolitica,
Staphylococcus aureus, and enteropathogenic E. coli were
sought by standard methods (14). The presence of Clostridium
perfringens enterotoxin (CPE) was determined either by
assaying the cytopathic effect on Vero cells or by reverse pas-
sive latex agglutination (RPLA) test (Oxoid Italia Spa, Gar-
bagnate Milanese, Milan) according to the manufacturer’s
instructions (14).
Stool and vomit suspensions were examined by NLV-spe-
cific reverse transcription/polymerase chain reaction (RT/
PCR) with generic primers JV12–JV13 to a consensus
sequence on the RNA polymerase segment of the genome
shared by most NLV strains (15). For confirmation of the diag-
nosis, gels were further analyzed by Southern blot with a mix-
ture of NLV-specific probes (15). The 327-bp amplification
product was subjected to sequence analysis with PCR primers,
and the sequences obtained were aligned with those in the Euro-
pean Molecular Biology Laboratory Nucleotide Data Bank. 
After July 13, water samples were repeatedly collected
from the main public water supply and from various points
outside and inside the resort. Samples from food in the kitchen
and the refrigerators were collected and sent to the University
of Bari on July 18. Water and food samples were subjected to
culture tests for enteric bacterial pathogens, according to stan-
dard methods.
Results
Descriptive Epidemiology
Of 344 cases identified from July 1 to 31, 69 (20%) were
in staff members. Information on personal characteristics and
clinical presentation was available for 248 ill persons (Table
1). Diarrhea, vomiting, and abdominal pain were observed in
Figure 2. Water supply system in tourist resort, Italy.
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>70% of all cases. Five patients were hospitalized; all recov-
ered rapidly and were discharged within a few hours. None of
the patients had any further sequelae. Attack rates did not dif-
fer by age, sex, or symptoms for cases in guests or staff mem-
bers. For cases in guests, the median interval from the arrival
date at the resort and onset of symptoms was 4 days, and
symptoms developed in 77% within 5 days.
The epidemic curve shows three distinct peaks in each of
the 3 weeks, beginning on July 12 (70 cases), July 18 (26
cases), and July 27 (55 cases). Over the total outbreak period,
275 cases occurred in guests and 58 in staff (Figure 3). Fifty-
seven percent of cases in staff members occurred before July
15. The outbreak lasted 24 days, and no cases were observed
after July 31.
Because of the rapid turnover at the resort, attack rates for
guests were calculated separately for each week: an attack rate
of 102 (10.5%) of 970 was observed in week 1; 66 (8.7%) of
760 in week 2; and 105 (10.1%) of 1,034 in week 3. Ill guests
occupied 157 of the resort’s 456 rooms. No significant evi-
dence of either clustering by the cluster k-means methods
(p=0.392) or increased frequency of cases in rooms near the
water pipeline was observed. Attack rates by sex, age group,
and week of stay were similar.
Analytical Epidemiology
For the analysis of risk factors in the cohort study, 181
questionnaires from 224 staff members were completed and
analyzed. The attack rate in this group was 69 (38.1%) of 181.
The lowest attack rates were observed in staff members who
worked in the kitchen or the office, and the highest were in
waiters, sports trainers, entertainers, and cleaning staff (i.e.,
staff members who have close contact with guests) (Table 2).
Staff members who took showers on the beach or consumed
drinks with ice were more likely to become ill than those who
did not. No association was found between disease and eating
any particular type of food or with being at work on July 8–11
(the first days of the outbreak) (Table 3). 
Microbiologic Results
Stool samples from 28 patients were negative for ova and
parasites and bacterial enteropathogens. Of the 28 stool sam-
ples examined by NLV-specific RT-PCR, 22 had an amplified
DNA of the size expected for NLV. The 327-bp amplification
product was also confirmed for all samples by Southern blot
hybridization with NLV-specific probes. Vomit specimens
from two other subjects were negative.
A readable common sequence of 290 bp was obtained with
sequence analysis and found to be the same for eight samples,
indicating a single outbreak virus strain. The sequence was
analyzed against the European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Nucleotide Data Bank, yielding a best fit with the RNA poly-
merase sequence of the Lordsdale strain of NLV (16). Nucle-
otide identity between the two strains was 93.1% (270/290
residues), indicating that the outbreak NLV strain belongs to
GGII. 
When the stool supernatants stored at -20°C were exam-
ined by the Vero cell assay for free bacterial toxins, a CPE
consistent with that of C. perfringens enterotoxin was induced
by seven samples. The RPLA test confirmed the presence of
C. perfringens enterotoxin in all seven samples. The positive
specimens had been collected July 18–21, and all were also
positive for NLV (Table 4). 
Table 1. Personal characteristics of ill persons and clinical symptoms, 
tourist resort, Italy, July 2000
Characteristics Guests Staff members Total
Information available (n) 179 69 248
Age (years); mean 
(range)
23 (1–88) 26 (19–53) 24 (1–88)
Female (%) 52 54 53
Diarrhea (%) 93 92 93
Vomiting (%) 84 72 80
Fever (%) 53 58 54
Abdominal pain (%) 63 83 70
Hospitalization (%) 2.2 1.4 2.0
Figure 3. Cases of gastroenteritis
with known date of onset (n=333)
in guests and staff members at a
tourist resort, Italy, July 2000. 
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All food samples tested were negative for enteropatho-
genic bacteria. Water samples collected on July 13 from fau-
cets in the bar, the kitchen, and a guest room (Figure 2, point
6) had high levels of coliforms (up to 130 CFU/mL) and fecal
streptococci (up to 22 CFU/mL). The same level of contami-
nation was observed in water samples from the pipe connect-
ing the resort to the public water supply (Figure 2, point 2);
samples collected from the public water supply outside the
resort (Figure 2, point 1) were always negative. After July 15,
when chlorine was added to the tank, the level of contamina-
tion of tap water inside the resort steadily decreased; no con-
tamination was detectable after superchlorination on July 22. 
Discussion
Although NLV gastroenteritis epidemics likely occur as
frequently in Italy as in the rest of Europe, to our knowledge
this is the first outbreak of NLV infection to be confirmed in
the country. It affected many guests and employees at a sum-
mer vacation resort and involved high attack rates in all age
groups. The actual number of cases has likely been underesti-
mated since persons with a mild illness may not have sought
medical attention. In fact, the retrospective investigation of
staff members showed an attack rate three times higher than in
guests. 
This outbreak had an unusual pattern, with three regular
peaks occurring at constant intervals for 3 weeks. This pattern,
which is compatible with a point-source infection (3), may be
explained by the rapid turnover of guests and their periodic
replacement with susceptible persons in the presence of a con-
stant exposure to infection. Most guests arrived at the resort on
a Saturday and stayed 1–2 weeks. Guests who became ill did
so a few days after their arrival, suggesting that exposure to a
source of infection was relatively constant during the whole
period. Moreover, a large proportion of staff members had
onset of illness in the first week of the outbreak. The hypothe-
sis of a common source of infection is further supported by the
identical nucleotide sequence detected in viruses from eight
patients during the outbreak.
Water was the likely source of this outbreak. Environmen-
tal inspection identified a breakdown in the water system of
the resort, and tap water samples from different places in the
resort showed contamination with fecal bacteria. Although
microbiologic testing for NLV could not be performed on
drinking or recreational water, the presence of fecal bacteria
suggests that the water system may have been the actual
source of NLV.  Despite the possible passage of the virus
through several hosts during the outbreak, the genome seg-
ment used for diagnosis showed complete stability, suggesting
that a very high number of human passages may be required to
produce the known nucleotide variability for NLV, at least in
the RNA polymerase region.
Table 2. Attack rates and relative risks for staff members (n=69) 
according to type of work, tourist resort, Italy, July 2000
Type of work Attack rate (%) Relative risk 95% CI a
Kitchen staff 4/34 (11.8) Referent
Office staff 3/14 (21.4) 1.8 0.5–7.1
Bar staff 3/11 (27.3) 2.3 0.6–8.8
Shop assistant 7/21 (33.3) 2.8 0.9–8.5
Cleaning staff 16/36 (44.4) 3.8 1.4–10.2
Sports trainers and 
entertainers
19/37 (51.4) 4.4 1.6–11.5
Waiters 17/28 (60.7) 5.2 2.0–13.6
aCI, confidence interval.
Table 3. Attack rates and relative risks according to usual behaviors and activities of staff members, tourist resort, Italy, July 2000
Exposure No. (n=69) No. exposed Attack rate (%) Relative risk 95% CI a
Shower on the beach 22 14 63.6 1.8 1.2–2.6
Swimming in the pool 45 22 48.9 1.4 0.9–2.0
Drinking tap water 104 47 45.2 1.4 0.9–2.2
Drinks with ice 128 55 43.0 1.8 1.0–3.2
Swimming in the sea 72 31 43.0 1.2 0.8–1.7
Eating at resort restaurant 159 64 40.2 1.5 0.5–3.9
Eating ice cream 140 56 40.0 1.1 0.6–1.9
Eating meat 151 60 39.7 1.2 0.6–2.4
Eating salad 123 48 39.0 1.0 0.6–1.6
Eating fruit 139 54 38.8 1.0 0.6–1.8
Eating pasta 142 55 38.7 1.2 0.6–2.1
Consuming drinks on draught 91 35 38.5 1.0 0.7–1.4
Eating fish 112 40 35.7 0.7 0.5–1.1
Eating seafood 85 28 32.9 0.7 0.5–1.1
aCI, confidence interval.
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Some specimens showed evidence of simultaneous infec-
tion with NLV and enterotoxigenic C. perfringens. The food
item(s) that could have been the source of infection by C. per-
fringens remained unknown. However, the presence of C. per-
fringens enterotoxin in a small, defined cluster of patients (7 of
28 stool samples) and the concomitant presence of NLV in the
7 positive stools suggests that C. perfringens played only a
minor role, if any, in the outbreak.
Control measures to limit the spread of the infection had
no effect, probably because they did not address the point
source and failed to prevent person-to-person transmission.
After July 15, 2000, the consumption of tap water was banned,
and only bottled mineral water was served in the resort restau-
rant and used to wash vegetables. Water from the main tank,
however, continued to be used for showers, to make ice for
consumption (through July 28), and for irrigation. Further-
more, on July 22, the bypass pipe was removed, the water
inside the resort tank underwent superchlorination, and the
pipe connecting the resort to the public water supply was shut
down. However, NLV do survive high levels of chlorination
(3,8), and the treatment was performed only once, at a late
stage of the outbreak, and at only one point upstream of the
resort water system. Finally, although the resort was serviced
by a mobile tank truck that provided water from the main pub-
lic water supply, the resort main tank was never emptied and
cleaned before treatment. Therefore, after July 22, contami-
nated residual water could have been gradually diluted by
refilling the resort tank with clean water from mobile tanks. 
In the cohort study of staff members, having showers on
the beach was identified as a risk factor, while consuming
drinks with ice was only weakly associated with illness. No
exposure to other water sources, including drinking tap water
(the use of which was forbidden after July 15) was significant.
Our analysis found no evidence that contaminated food was
the source of infection: no food preference was associated with
an increased risk of being ill, and personnel working in the
kitchen had the lowest attack rate. 
In addition to water contamination, person-to-person trans-
mission may have played a role in this outbreak. Typically
staff members of tourist resorts share the same living quarters
and have frequent contact with guests during meals, sport
training, entertainment, and other activities. Person-to-person
transmission may also explain the fact that the time between
arrival and onset of symptoms in guests was longer than the
incubation period expected for NLV. Person-to-person trans-
mission of NLV infection is well documented (8), and second-
ary cases may occur. Airborne and fomite transmission also
may facilitate the spread of the virus during outbreaks. Such
hypothesis is confirmed by the higher attack rate in the clean-
ing staff and in staff members working in close contact with
guests.
This investigation had several limitations. Since the cohort
study was carried out after the outbreak had ended, we could
inquire only about food preferences and usual activities rather
than actual food histories and activities before the outbreak.
Recall bias may have occurred, which may have led to nondif-
ferential misclassification of exposure and underestimation of
the observed relative risks. If NLV had spread through water
and person-to-person transmission had occurred, virtually
everyone in the resort would have been exposed to the agent
and any epidemiologic association would be difficult to find.
Finally, no test specific for NLV was performed on water sam-
ples, and the hypothesis of water as the actual source of infec-
tion cannot be confirmed.
In conclusion, this event confirms that large outbreaks due
to NLV may be occurring in Italy, but without the use of
appropriate diagnostic methods this pathogen may go unrecog-
nized. This occurrence highlights the need for a surveillance
system of such outbreaks in cooperation with laboratories
capable of diagnosing viral gastrointestinal infections.
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